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This article examines the relationship between altruism and agency costs in family business
through an in-depth case study of a family firm. We found that altruism reduced agency
costs in the early stages of the business, but that agency problems increased as the venture
became larger and more established. Moreover, we suggest that altruistic behavior need not
be confined to family and close kin, but may extend through networks of distant kin and
ethnic ties. We thus present a more complex view of the agency relationship in family
business than is often portrayed in the existing literature.
In a recent article, Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma (2005, p. 559) suggest that the core
challenge facing family business research is to identify “the nature of family firms’
distinctions” and to determine “if and how these distinctions result from family involve-
ment.” As family business researchers have grappled with these issues, they have relied
heavily on agency theory, and, in particular, on the notion of altruism. This approach has
resulted in a number of important insights, yet the effects of altruism in family business
remain uncertain. For example, it is unclear under what conditions altruism reduces
agency costs (e.g., Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2003) and under what conditions it
increases them (e.g., Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003).
This lack of clarity suggests that considerably more work is required in order to
develop a comprehensive theory of altruism as a distinctive aspect of family business.
Moreover, altruism has implications for the nonfamily members of family firms, and
this issue has rarely been examined in the literature. In this article, we report the results
of a case study of a family business, which sheds significant additional light on this
topic.
Our case study grows out of a larger research project conducted by one of the authors
(Karra, 2005). Over the past 3 years, she has conducted a study of entrepreneurial new
ventures that began international operations soon after founding. During this research






project, it became apparent that many of these companies were family owned and
characterized by complex networks of family, kinship, and ethnic ties. One firm from this
larger study was selected in order to explore the family dynamics that occurred in the
development of these ventures. The firm that was chosen, Neroli,1 is a medium-sized
fashion firm headquartered in Turkey that manufactures and sells a range of leather goods
and clothing. It has production facilities in Istanbul and a distribution network spanning
much of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
In exploring the role of family influence in the development of this family-owned new
venture, the study makes several contributions to the family business literature. First, we
show that in the early stages of family businesses, altruistic behavior has the potential to
align the interests of family and kin and to help build a competitive advantage.
Second, we argue that family firms may expand the logic of the family beyond the
nuclear family through kinship and ethnicity in order to create a form of quasi-family. In
this case, the owner of Neroli leveraged ethnic ties and the shared experience of living
under communism to build a network of relationships that shared the characteristics of
the family ties that existed at the center of the firm. Our analysis suggests a more fluid
conception of “family,” one that is at least partly negotiated rather than automatically
attributed by virtue of blood or marriage.
Third, we show that there are limits to altruism as family businesses develop and grow,
and that agency costs may therefore increase over time. However, we argue that the nature
of the agency problems experienced differ between family and near kin and between the
quasi-family based on distant kin and ethnic ties. With regard to the former, agency issues
take the form of moral hazard; in the latter, they take the form of adverse selection.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of the literature on
agency theory and altruism as it relates to family business and outline the research
questions that underpin the study. We then explain why we chose Neroli and how the data
were collected and analyzed. In the third section, we present the story of Neroli. Building
on the case study, in the fourth section we present our findings on the relationship between
altruism and agency in family firms. We conclude by considering the implications of the
study and discuss some directions for future research.
Agency Theory, Altruism, and the Family Firm
There is a large and growing body of work that considers the ways in which family
businesses differ from nonfamily businesses (Chrisman et al., 2005). One of the most
successful approaches to developing a theory of the family firm that takes into account the
distinctive dynamics inherent in family business, and the role of the business as a family
institution, has been agency theory. At the core of agency theory is the potential conflict
between the owners of a firm (the principal) and the managers under contract to run the
firm on the owner’s behalf (the agent).
Agency theory highlights two characteristics of agency relationships (Eisenhardt,
1989a): (1) the interests and objectives of the agent and the principal and (2) the approach
to risk of the agent and the principal, both of which are likely to diverge under certain
circumstances and which may lead to conflicting decision-making preferences. As a result
of asymmetric information, it is difficult for the principal to monitor the actions of
the agent. Moreover, because contracts are incomplete and cannot address all possible
1. The names of companies and individuals have been disguised for confidentiality.
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contingencies, it is impossible for the principal to ensure that the agent acts appropriately
in all circumstances (Alchian & Woodward, 1988).
Under the conditions of asymmetric information and in the absence of complete
contracts, two main kinds of agency problem may arise (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004).
The first is adverse selection, which occurs when the principal enters into a contract with
an agent who is not well qualified or is in some other way unsuitable for the tasks to
be performed. The second is moral hazard, a term that “suggests that people cannot be
counted on to do what they say they are going to do, and that failure manifests itself in
prices and contractual arrangements” (Alchian & Woodward, 1988, p. 68). Moral hazard
is a form of opportunism and includes shirking, free riding, and the consumption of perks.
Agency problems such as these inhibit cooperative relationships between agents and
principals. To control these problems, principals adopt a series of incentive mechanisms
(both hortatory and punitive) to try to ensure that the actions of the agent are consistent
with the objectives of the principal. The costs of negotiating and implementing these
incentives, as well as the costs of monitoring them, are referred to as agency costs.
Early proponents of agency theory suggested that agency costs in family firms are
negligible or absent because the interests of family members are likely to be closely
aligned (Fama & Jensen, 1983, 1985). This, it is argued, leads to effective decision making
because owners have the capacity to ensure that decisions are made with a view to
maximizing family wealth and/or securing a legacy for future generations. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) even suggested that formal governance mechanisms in family firms are
at best unnecessary, and at worst may actually damage business performance. From this
perspective, family business is a very efficient form of organization, with intrinsic advan-
tages over nonfamily organizational forms (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Kang, 2000).
The assumption of these authors is that individuals, households, and firms are rational
actors seeking to maximize their economic utility. In family business studies, however,
comparatively few scholars have sought to work within these confines, preferring instead
to consider that actors have a range of preferences and objectives (e.g., Chrisman et al.,
2004; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). More specifically, a key assumption in the
family business literature is that in addition to economic goals, families may have non-
economic goals such as providing employment for family members and building family
cohesion.2 This changes the nature of the agency relationship because it is possible for
family members to make decisions that lead to a suboptimal business performance by,
for example, the excessive consumption of perks, but at the same time exhibit behaviors
that are consistent with the objectives of the owner of the firm (Chrisman et al., 2004).
In seeking to explain this characteristic of family firms, the concept of altruism
features prominently. Van den Berghe and Carchon (2003) suggest that altruism provides
a powerful conceptual tool for understanding why family firms exist. Dyer (2003, p. 408)
voices a similar opinion, arguing that it plays “a unique role in family firms that is not
generally found in other enterprises.”
In religious studies and in some strands of philosophy, altruism refers to a moral value
that leads individuals to act in the interests of others without the expectation of reward or
positive reinforcement in return. In economics, on the other hand, altruism is considered
as a utility function that connects the welfare of one individual to that of others (Schulze
et al., 2003), and for the most part it is this conception of altruism that has been applied
in family business studies. Thus, parents exhibit high levels of munificence with respect
2. There is, however, a disagreement about the range of noneconomic goals that family businesses pursue
(Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997).
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to their children not only because of the bond that exists between them, but also because
their own interests, and those of the business, would be damaged were they to act less
benevolently.
There is much debate, however, about whether altruistic behavior increases and/or
decreases agency costs in family firms. Van den Berghe and Carchon (2003), for example,
argue that altruism encourages a number of behaviors that reduce agency costs and
improve firm performance. First, an altruistic behavior creates a self-reinforcing system of
incentives that encourages family members to be thoughtful and “selfless” to one another.
Second, it gives rise to a sense of collective ownership among the family members
employed in the firm. Third, it reduces the information asymmetries among family
members. Finally, it generates an organizational culture that encourages risk taking by,
for example, exploring international growth opportunities (Zahra, 2003). There is some
empirical evidence to support this position, especially when the altruism is reciprocal and
symmetrical (i.e., exhibited evenly by both parties). For example, Chrisman et al. (2004)
found that, overall, family involvement may decrease agency problems, and Eaton, Yuan,
and Wu (2002) show econometrically that reciprocal and symmetrical altruism leads to
competitive advantages with respect to some business opportunities.3 Chua and Schnabel
(1986), Chami (1997), and Carney (2005) also provide evidence to suggest that altruism
can help build a competitive advantage.
Equally, there is empirical evidence to suggest that altruism may be a “two-edged
sword” (Dyer, 2003, p. 405). For example, while Schulze et al. (2003, p. 475) noted that
“altruism compels parents to care for their children, encourages family members to be
considerate of one another, and makes family membership valuable in ways that both
promote and sustain the bond among them,” they also found a number of important agency
problems closely associated with altruism: free riding and biased views from parents
about the aptitude of children, the consumption of perks by family members, and prob-
lems in the enforcement of contracts. This led them to conclude that “family-ownership
does not appear to represent the kind of governance panacea that Fama and Jensen (1983)
and others attribute to family owner-management” (Schulze et al., p. 487). In the same
vein, Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) show that the preferential treat-
ment of family members leads to increased rather than decreased problems of agency.
Given the relatively limited empirical evidence and the mixed picture painted by the
empirical evidence that does exist (suggesting that altruism may have both positive and
negative implications for the principal–agent relationship), important questions remain
about the effects of altruistic behavior on agency costs in the family firm. In particular,
under what circumstances does altruism increase and/or reduce agency costs? Rephrased
as a research question:
What is the relationship between altruism and agency costs in family businesses?
Does this relationship vary over time?
In the remainder of the article, we will address these questions through an in-depth
case study of a successful family business. The case is particularly interesting not only
because altruism formed a central strand of the founder’s strategy from the firm’s incep-
tion, but also because the altruistic behavior he exhibited was directed both toward family
members and toward key nonfamily members of the business and its network. Moreover,
unlike much of the existing empirical evidence, which is predominantly quantitative in
nature, the use of qualitative methods allowed agency issues to be explored in a way that
3. Cited in Chrisman et al. (2005).
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is sensitive to the context in which the focal firm operated and to carefully track the
evolving relationship between altruism and agency costs over a period spanning several
years.
Methodology
As noted, the study that forms the basis of this article began 3 years ago when one of
the authors interviewed the owner and CEO of Neroli, Ishmael Karov, as part of a larger
research project on international new venture creation (Karra, 2005). Karov founded
Neroli in Istanbul in the late-1990s and guided it through a period of rapid growth,
successfully penetrating markets across Eastern Europe. By the end of the study, the firm
employed about 750 people and had 87 retail outlets across the former Soviet republics
and Eastern Europe.
We chose to study Neroli for three reasons. First, the case has “rare or unique”
qualities that make it a logical candidate for “theoretical sampling” (Eisenhardt, 1989b;
Yin, 1994). Preliminary research revealed that the firm had grown rapidly over a relatively
short period of time and relied upon a high level of family involvement. The organization
of the firm remained family-based, and most employees were either relatives or shared the
same ethnic background as the owner. In addition, the entrepreneur’s motivation for
founding the firm was the betterment of the family, and the dynamics of the family were
therefore central to the firm.
Second, Karov provided a very high level of access to the firm. We were able to
interview him and other important members of the firm on multiple occasions during the
period of the study, and he provided us with extensive archival data relating to the history
of the firm. In addition, one of the coauthors was able to travel with him to attend key
meetings with distributors and retailers in Russia and Eastern Europe and to attend trade
shows and visit important suppliers in Italy. She was also able to interview all of the family
members and other key individuals, including manufacturing partners and employees.
Third, the firm was only slightly more than a decade old at the time of the study, and
the founder was still the CEO of the company. This was significant because it increased
the likelihood that the details of the founding of the firm and its early development
remained fresh in the minds of the founder and other interviewees. We therefore consider
Neroli a “strategic research site” (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987) for studying altruism in
family business.
Data Collection and Analysis
Interview and archival data were collected during several trips to Istanbul as well as
during visits to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. In addition, a number of
telephone interviews were conducted with key members of the firm and its partners in
Turkey, Italy, the United States, and in the former Soviet Republics. One of the authors
speaks English, Turkish, Russian, Italian, and Bulgarian, and where possible, the inter-
views were carried out in the first language of the interviewees. We also collected
substantial secondary data in order to understand the historical context within which the
firm was founded.
The data were analyzed in a two-stage process. In the first stage, the case study data
were organized into an “event history database” (Garud & Rappa, 1994). This was done
by chronologically ordering descriptions of events taken from the raw data—interview
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transcripts, interview and field notes, and secondary sources such as journalists’ accounts
of the political and economic context—and by juxtaposing multiple accounts against each
other to ascertain the degree of convergence. One of the authors had previously worked for
the company as a translator (1996–2002), and therefore had a detailed understanding
of the growth of the firm.4 This knowledge, combined with the interview and field notes,
allowed for the development of a narrative of the formation and subsequent expansion of
the firm (see Table 1).
In the second stage of data analysis, we documented and tracked the motivations of
the entrepreneur, the degree of involvement of family members, the role of other key
actors, the evolving business model, and the factors that emerged as critical to the firm’s
success. We then examined the evolution of the firm over time, paying particular attention
to the role of family members and to evidence of altruism and agency costs. As we
developed the chronology of the case, we looked at and carefully documented the theo-
retical issues that emerged. In this last process of “enfolding findings with the literature”
(Eisenhardt, 1989b), we brought together, iteratively, findings from the previous stage and
related them to the literature on family business and to our research questions. During this
4. While this personal knowledge was advantageous in terms of access and understanding the dynamics of the
firm, there are obvious dangers in terms of objectivity. The authors sought to address this point by reflecting
back the findings to key respondents on several occasions. Moreover, although the data were collected mostly
by one person, there were three researchers involved in the data analysis and writing up of the project. All of
the researchers met with the focal entrepreneur and talked with him at length about the case and our
interpretation of the salient issues.
Table 1
Critical Events in the Development of Neroli
Approximate dates Key events and issues Countries entered
1989–1992 Karov explores the possibility of selling leather bags and
purses to the Russian market.
—
Karov approaches a Turkish Yugoslavian immigrant who owns
a leather factory in Turkey about a possible collaboration.
1992–1994 The two men agree to open a small store in Istanbul (as a joint
venture). The store sells a range of leather goods and the
products are targeted mainly at Russian tourists.
Russia, Kazakhstan, Byelorussia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan
Karov works hard to build relationships with his Russian
retailers and distributors. The business is very profitable, but
Karov realizes that he must reach more retailers and
distributors if he is to realize his ambitions. This leads him
to appoint a distributor in a number of Russian cities. He
also develops relationships with distributors in Kazakhstan,
Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria.
1994–1999 The distribution network in Russia works very well. The
network expands to 77 stores across Eastern Europe, Russia,
and its former republics, incorporating around 750 people.
Bulgaria and Azerbaijan
In 1999, Karov decides to form his own brand (Neroli) and to
source products from a much wider range of manufacturers.
2000–present The network works to expand distribution into the United
States and the United Kingdom, but makes little impact.
Attempting to enter North
America and Italy
Network members complain that they lack expertise in key
areas such as marketing and finance.
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process, we moved back and forth between data and theory until we reached a “theoretical
saturation” (Garud, Sanjay, & Arun, 2002).
Neroli: A Family-Owned International New Venture
Ishmael Karov and his family were among the 360,000 Turkish Bulgarians forced to
emigrate from Bulgaria to Turkey in June 1989. Following their emigration, Karov and his
brothers found work as welders while their wives worked as cleaners and textile workers.
Very soon, however, frustration with the lack of opportunities for immigrants in his new
country led Karov to conclude that “working in factories, for someone else’s profit, would
never do the family any good.” He therefore went back to Bulgaria and sold the family
property in order to raise capital to start a business.
His idea was to open up a store in Laleli, a neighborhood in Istanbul frequented by
non-Turkish entrepreneurs known as “luggage traders.” Following the collapse of the
Berlin wall, there was an insatiable demand for consumer goods in former Communist
countries, and thousands of entrepreneurs from the newly capitalist transition economies
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had began to visit Istanbul. These
entrepreneurs came to the city to buy inexpensive Turkish merchandise that they then took
back to their home countries “in their luggage” for resale. The new luggage traders were
an unexpected but very welcome export opportunity. Although largely unofficial, this
trade reached an estimated U.S.$8.8 billion by 1998, a significant proportion of Turkey’s
official total exports, which ranged from $20 to $30 billion per year over the decade
(Yukseker, 2003).
Despite selling their family property, Karov and his family did not have enough
capital to open a store to benefit from the luggage traders. More importantly, none of the
family members knew how to do business in Turkey. In addition, they had all grown up in
Bulgaria and spoke Bulgarian and Russian very well, but their command of the Turkish
language was limited. After consulting his family, Karov contacted a friend—a Yugosla-
vian immigrant in Turkey—who owned a business that manufactured leather wallets
under the Jenni brand name, and proposed a partnership that involved Karov running a
store in the Laleli district, selling Jenni products to entrepreneurs from Russia and Eastern
Europe. Although Jenni had sold leather goods in the Turkish market for almost 30 years,
it was not a well-known brand, and in recent years, the financial health of the company had
deteriorated sharply. Karov’s offer, therefore, suited both parties. It was agreed that Karov
would own just 10% of the store, reflecting the fact that his partner would provide the
initial capital to establish the venture.
From the opening of the store in November 1991, the demand among the luggage
traders for Jenni products was strong, and the company sold 210,000 items in the first year
alone. From the very beginning, the transactions between Karov and the luggage traders
were based on mutual trust and a sense of shared experience of living under communism.
Karov would even allow some customers to purchase goods on account and bring the
money back to him once they had sold them in their home markets.
In the beginning, virtually all of the products bought by the luggage traders were sold
in street markets. The large department stores in the transition economies were still state
owned, and there were no private stores or boutiques yet. However, even in the street
markets, Karov insisted that the products be displayed with a sign featuring the brand
name Jenni and be sold in Jenni-branded shopping bags.
In 1994, Karov took a risky step and invited 20 of his most trusted Russian traders to
open official Jenni stores in Moscow. This move included a new organizational structure
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based on the appointment of a main distributor in each city who was responsible for
selling Jenni products to the retailers in the city in which they were located. By conferring
ownership and responsibility onto these distributors, Karov believed that they would come
to see the brand as their own and be more likely to work constructively with him to
develop the brand. In addition, Karov sought to convey to his distributors that they were
not engaged in a purely commercial relationship—he emphasized that they were friends
and partners who shared a common history and whose interests were intertwined; they
were the new entrepreneurs that had emerged from the former communist system and
who were taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the transition to a market
economy.
Establishing a distribution network not only strengthened the Jenni brand by moving
the products out of the street markets into stores but also allowed Karov to have access to
a very large market whose laws, regulations, and business conventions were very unfa-
miliar to him. He was also able to avoid dealing with corrupt officials and any involvement
in unlawful business dealings by relying upon his distributors’ knowledge and contacts.
Although he circumvented many of the difficult issues associated with business
operations in Russia, his relationship with his partner in Turkey (the owner of Jenni)
became increasingly fractious. In particular, Karov was unhappy that his partner’s sons
had taken a substantive stake in the business, and was frustrated that he was unable to
bring any of his own family members into the venture. Karov discussed his discontent
with his partner and openly declared that he wanted to create his own leather goods
business using the distribution network that he had developed while selling Jenni products
from the store in Istanbul. His partner agreed on the condition that Karov would continue
to distribute the Jenni brand in the Russian market; he appeared unconcerned that the two
brands might be in competition, believing it unlikely that Karov could build a business that
would threaten the Jenni brand.
During 1999, Karov entered the Russian market with his own brand, which he named
after his daughter Neroli. He took the opportunity to make his business a family business
and quickly involved family members in key positions. In the first instance, his wife joined
him in the store and took on the crucial role of managing relationships with the firm’s
distributors. Karov also made his brothers partners in the firm despite the fact that they did
not invest any capital. He said it was not acceptable to ask for a financial input from his
closest family members and that the help and trust they provide was worth more to him
than money. Besides, he felt that it was his obligation as the eldest brother to provide for
the family. Karov’s generosity, however, did not stop at his closest family members. He
also employed his more distant relatives and a significant number of Turkish Bulgarian
immigrants (many of whom struggled to find employment in Turkey). Some of them had
already worked for him at the Jenni manufacturing plant but were keen to move to Neroli
and help him with this new endeavor, in part because they felt “obligated towards someone
from [our] kin.”
From the outset, there was a strong interest in the new brand from Karov’s Russian
distributors, and the relationship between Karov and his distributors was critical to the
operation of the new business. Consider the following quotation from a Ukrainian
distributor:
This is not about a brand. It is much more about the people. All my transactions with
the Jenni brand have always been with Karov and I would not want to work with
someone else. If Karov sells X brand, I will have that in my store. If one day, he sells
clothes, I will sell that. I trust him. He is a good businessman. . . . A good person.
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Within a year, Neroli began to outperform Jenni in terms of sales. There were several
reasons for Neroli’s strong performance. First, Neroli worked with well-known Italian
designers and suppliers, and the products were of much higher quality. Second, the
Russian distributors trusted Karov and had worked with him for some time. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, the Neroli brand proved popular with Russian consumers. By
2005, Karov had established a network of 87 stores in 9 countries, with combined sales of
almost 700,000 units per year.
However, despite these successes, the reliance on this extended network of family and
friendship ties has begun to inhibit the development of the firm in some important
respects. In particular, Karov frequently recounted the problems of finding suitably
qualified personnel, especially in professional roles such as accounting and marketing. He
has also struggled to find a reliable English translator (in his own words, he “only” speaks
Russian, Bulgarian, and Turkish), which has proved a major stumbling block in his so far
unsuccessful attempts to expand into Western Europe and North America. Moreover,
during the data collection, it was striking that almost everyone working for Neroli spoke
a Turkish-Bulgarian dialect rather than Turkish, making it very hard for “outsiders” to “fit
in” (see Table 1 for a summary of the events described in this section).
Learning from Neroli
The case of Neroli provides an important opportunity to develop a deeper understand-
ing of the effects of family influence on family business. Based on the case analysis, we
present three findings. In the first subsection, we examine the role of altruism in family
business, arguing that the altruistic behavior exhibited by Karov toward family and near
kin resulted in reduced agency costs and was fundamental to the early development of the
firm.
In the following subsection, we consider how Karov managed to replicate the logic of
the family, and the trust and norms of reciprocity that underpin it, to nonfamily members.
This led to the creation of a quasi-family based on distant kinship and ethnic ties, and also
reduced agency costs as the firm sought to expand.
In the final subsection, we examine the limits of altruism in family business. We found
that agency costs increased over time as the business developed. Interestingly, however,
different kinds of agency cost were evident among blood relations and nonblood relations.
With respect to family and near kin, agency costs manifested themselves in the form of
moral hazard. With respect to quasi-family members connected through distant kinship
and ethnic ties, on the other hand, agency costs manifested themselves in the form of
adverse selection.
Altruism as a Strategy for Growth
Altruism and, in particular, a concern for the welfare of family members and a desire
to build a legacy for them was central to Karov’s motivation to build a business and his
approach to managing it. In other words, the existence of Neroli is inextricably inter-
twined with the altruistic motivations of the founder. When Karov first founded Neroli, he
immediately involved his wife, his brothers, and his sisters-in-law in the new venture. His
brothers were given equity in the firm without contributing capital. Crucially, Karov
sought to ensure that this involvement was active rather than passive; he worked closely
with family members, asking for their input, giving them responsibility for key business
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functions, and emphasizing their importance to the organization. The sense of belonging
and ownership that this engendered appeared to have motivated family members to “go the
extra mile” for the business.
For example, following difficult experiences with professional drivers who would
“come up with all kinds of reasons to rip you off,” Karov’s brothers offered to take
responsibility for transporting Neroli merchandise from Istanbul to destinations around
Russia, an arduous journey that involved being away from Istanbul for several weeks at a
time. Similarly, Karov’s wife and his sisters-in-law volunteered to undertake a range of
unskilled and unpleasant duties such as cleaning and packing merchandise in the ware-
house, in addition to their existing administrative responsibilities, to ensure that shipments
went out on time.
As well as Karov’s immediate family (i.e., wife, siblings, and children), his kinship
network (comprising of aunts, uncles, cousins, and friends of the family) also played a key
role. This network, like many kinship networks, was characterized by strong ties, a sense
of shared cultural identity, and the charisma and leadership capabilities of the central
figure (Peng, 2004). In this respect, the Neroli kinship network evokes comparison with
Chinese guanxi circles (Wong, 1998); Neroli extended from the center (i.e., Karov) to
immediate family members, and then to more distant relatives and family friends.
As Neroli developed, members of the kinship network worked very long hours, often
without vacation. Some even slept in the factory to ensure that orders with key distributors
were filled during the busiest periods. During the fieldwork, many of them stressed that
they were indebted to Karov for offering them employment and were “very well taken
care of.” In addition, we were told of many acts of generosity by Karov toward his kin. For
example, he financed the education of several of the children of his employees and paid
for their medical expenses and weddings.
In the early stages of Neroli, the ability to rely on family and near kin afforded the
business a high degree of flexibility that helped to reduce the risk and uncertainty associated
with building a new venture. Karov appears to have struck the appropriate mix of incentives
and managerial control to align the interests of family members. As a result, Neroli
benefited from reduced information asymmetries and monitoring costs, which helped to
place the business on a solid early footing. These observations are consistent with other
findings in family business studies (e.g., Van den Berghe & Carchon, 2003; Zahra, 2005),
which suggest that an altruistic behavior can reduce agency problems in family firms.
Interestingly, we did not find evidence that Karov used or threatened to use sanctions
to discipline family and near kin in the event of malfeasance, nor did he use specific
monetary incentives to alter behavior. At this stage in Neroli’s development, the altruistic
behavior exhibited was reciprocal and symmetrical, and appeared to be motivated (on both
sides) by a willingness to be part of and to build a family institution.
Building the Quasi-Family
Peredo (2003) introduces the concept of “spiritual kin-based businesses,” which she
distinguishes from the “blood and marriage kin-based businesses” that dominate the
family business literature. In developing this concept, Peredo (2003) expands the notion
of the family beyond the biological family and suggests that groups of individuals use
ritual—social, cultural, or religious—in order to “recreate” the characteristics normally
attributed to the biological family. Specifically, she suggests that spiritual kin displays a
series of rights and obligations toward one another. For example, in return for offering
support and protection, often in the form of employment, “family” leaders and their
organizations are rewarded with high levels of commitment and loyalty.
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In seeking to expand Neroli internationally, Karov deliberately attempted to foster
this kind of spiritual kin-based business and the sense of obligation and commitment that
it implies among distant kin and nonfamily members. Specifically, he used altruism and
shared ethnic identity as strategic tools in order to create a quasi-family unit. Most
significantly, as Karov established his distribution network across the post-Soviet bloc,
partners were continually reminded of their “shared experience of communism.” Karov
actively sought to build links with partners who were immigrants as this gave him
another mechanism through which to leverage a common bond and to build a sense of
“family.”
In addition to emphasizing common heritage, Karov exhibited extraordinary levels of
trust in the early stages of business relationships. For example, he advanced new partners
significant levels of stock, often up to $50,000, without any contractual protection in the
event of malfeasance—partners would be invited to repay Karov after the stock had been
sold, a highly unusual practice in Turkey and Eastern Europe. This kind of apparently
altruistic behavior, combined with an emphasis on shared ethnic identity, fostered very
high levels of trust among partners and resulted in a remarkably coherent network that
operated ostensibly in the manner of a biological family but extended far beyond its
traditional boundaries. Karov referred to his distributors as “friends,” while his distribu-
tors often referred to him as “family,” “father,” and “uncle.” Consider this quote from an
employee at Neroli:
I will work for Neroli day and night, vacations, weekends . . . without money even. I
trust Karov very much, and I want him to be even more successful. After all, he is an
immigrant too, and I would rather help an immigrant like me, than help a local
(employee, Neroli).
Thus, one of Karov’s most important strategic assets was his ability to negotiate and
renegotiate the boundaries and scope of this quasi-family. This suggests that altruism can
be employed by owner-managers to build loyalty and commitment among key organiza-
tional stakeholders outside of the biological family.
In addition, creating this kind of quasi-family had the effect of aligning the interests
of Karov with “family” members: They became “psychologically tied” (Pierce, Kostova,
& Dirks, 2001, p. 299) to the business and responded as if they had a residual claim on the
family’s estate (Schulze et al., 2003). With respect to the principal–agent relationship,
information asymmetries as well as the costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements
were reduced, thereby ameliorating agency problems. While this connection has not
explicitly been made in the context of family business studies, in organization studies the
propensity for (nonshareholding) employees to exhibit this kind of psychological owner-
ship, in relation to their employing organization (Dirks, Cummings, & Pierce, 1996) and
the tasks that they perform (Das, 1993), is well established.
Note that our conception of ethnicity emphasizes that ethnic identity is socially
constructed rather than objectively determined. Indeed, we follow Aldrich and Waldinger
(1990, p. 112) in defining ethnicity as:
an adjective that refers to differences between categories of people. When “ethnic” is
linked to group, it implies that members have some awareness of group membership
and a common origin and culture, or that others think of them as having these
attributes.
Moreover, while we acknowledge the significance of Peredo’s (2003) contribution,
the case of Neroli does not fit neatly with her conception of family. Rather than the simple
biological–spiritual dichotomy that Peredo (2003) outlined, we observed a more subtle
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distinction between family, kin, and ethnicity. In our case, the three can perhaps be
thought of as a set of concentric circles of decreasing rights and obligations as we move
outward from family to kin and, finally, to ethnicity. We recognize, of course, that the
relationship between kinship and ethnicity is not straightforward. Both kinship and eth-
nicity share the notions of heritage and distant interconnection. However, while extending
kinship through generations involves biological reproduction, extending ethnicity through
generations involves social reproduction and the construction of a shared identity.
Thus, the crux of our argument is that the boundaries of “family” within the family
firm are not objective and static, but rather negotiated and fluid. Furthermore, through
social connections, the development of a quasi-family based on distant kinship and
ethnicity (broadly defined) can ameliorate agency costs by aligning the interests of
quasi-family members.
The Limitations of Altruism in Family Business
As noted, Karov’s altruistic behavior toward family, kin, and nonfamily members
linked through ethnic ties created a sense of togetherness and reciprocity that permeated
throughout the firm and led to reduced agency costs. However, over time, as the firm grew
and became more successful, we observed that agency problems became increasingly
significant. Interestingly, different agency problems were evident among family and near
kin, and the quasi-family linked through distant kinship and ethnic ties. With regard to
family and near kin, agency problems manifested themselves mainly in the form of moral
hazard. Specifically, there was evidence of shirking, free riding, and the consumption of
perks. For example, Karov’s brothers, who played a prominent role in the early days of the
venture, became marginal figures with less and less interest in the welfare of the business
despite the fact that they had been given equity without investing any capital. According
to one respondent: “[T]hey [the brothers] like to sit around all day, drinking coffee or
playing computer games, while Karov runs this entire business.”
From our interviews, Karov was clearly concerned about the behavior of several
family members. Furthermore, his concerns were widely recognized within the firm. As
one respondent told us, he “feels helpless, as though his hands have been tied.” This kind
of behavior posed two problems for Karov. First, it conflicted with his vision of the family
working and succeeding together. Second, it created a sense of chronic organizational
injustice; some members of the family grew increasingly resentful of what they perceived
as equal rewards for unequal effort.
Yet he was unwilling to punish or sanction family and near kin connected with the
business; he appeared especially concerned about the ramifications upon familial rela-
tionships if he were to discipline family members. In other words, Karov prioritized the
welfare of the family over and above the welfare of the business. Thus, the behavior of
family members was, on one level, rewarded or at least encouraged by the incentive
structure that Karov had put in place. As this became increasingly apparent to family
members, the extent to which they shirked and consumed perks increased—they appeared
to develop a sense of entitlement in terms of their claim on the business.
With respect to nonblood relations in the quasi-family, on the other hand, increased
agency costs manifested themselves primarily in the form of adverse selection. Most
obviously, Karov’s preference for working with partners that shared the same ethnic
heritage and identity severely limited his choice of potential partners, and on several
occasions, Karov was left exposed as key individuals lacked the skills and competencies
to perform specific tasks effectively. In particular, this selection bias resulted in the firm
not having access to skilled professionals in accounting, marketing, and information
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technology. For example, Karov hired the daughter of a family friend as Neroli’s brand
manager although she did not have any marketing training or related experience. Karov
had originally thought that she would quickly learn the necessary skills because her
parents had worked in the fashion industry for many years. Over time, however, the
limitations of this strategy became increasingly apparent.
Adverse selection was also evident when Neroli sought to expand into markets
beyond Eastern Europe. This was dramatically illustrated by Neroli’s failed attempt to
enter the U.S. market early in 2004. At that time, Karov met Anton—a U.S.-based
businessman who had emigrated from Bulgaria to the United States in 1991—at a trade
fair in Russia. The two men quickly developed a strong relationship, and despite the fact
that Anton knew little about the leather goods industry, Karov was confident that he had
found a partner who could fulfill his “dream” of breaking into the American market. Their
relationship was based in part on their shared identity, and Karov drew comparisons
between his own struggle as an immigrant entrepreneur in Turkey and on Anton’s ambi-
tion to build a life for himself and his family in the United States. Karov declared that
“Anton is an immigrant and knows what it is to have the burning desire to earn money.”
But Anton was able to sell only a small fraction of the $50,000 of stock that Karov
had advanced to him and, very quickly, Anton’s lack of experience in distribution in
the fashion industry became obvious. To date, Neroli has made virtually no impact in the
United States or in Western Europe despite several attempts to do so. While adverse
selection is not the only reason for this lack of success, it was clearly an important
factor.
Our observations about the diverging interests of family members and the problems of
monitoring and enforcing contracts are consistent with the recent work of Schulze et al.
(2003) and Lubatkin et al. (2005). However, by making the connection between the
temporal maturity of family firms and the likelihood of increased agency costs, we believe
that we make an important contribution. Moreover, by suggesting that different kinds of
agency problems apply to different types of “family” member, we begin to develop a
“thicker” account of the principal–agent relationship in family firms than what has been
presented in much of the literature to date.
Conclusions and Implications
We began by highlighting Chrisman et al.’s (2005) assertion that a key task for family
business researchers is to identify the major differences between family and nonfamily
firms and to ascertain whether or not these differences have their roots in family involve-
ment. In this article, in common with other scholars in family business studies (e.g.,
Lubatkin et al., 2005), we have argued that altruism is a key distinguishing feature of
family business, one with profound implications for the principal–agent relationship.
Moreover, and following Schulze et al. (2003, p. 488), we suggest that “the economic
literature on altruism is a potentially useful resource that promises to . . . lead researchers
toward a richer theory of the family firm.”
We believe that we have made three important contributions to the family business
literature and, in particular, to developing an understanding of the complex role that
altruism plays in family firms. Significantly, our findings enable the apparently conflicting
empirical evidence on agency costs and family business to be incorporated into an
overarching framework that allows for the possibility that family influence may lead to
increased and decreased agency problems.
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Our first contribution is to show that altruism has the potential to align the interests
of family members and to reduce agency costs in the family firm, providing it is recip-
rocal and symmetrical. This is consistent with the founding fathers of agency theory
such as Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), as well as some
family business researchers (e.g., Eaton et al., 2002) who argued that family ownership
is a highly efficient form of organization because information asymmetries and moni-
toring costs are reduced.
Our second contribution is to show that the logic of the family, and of altruistic
behavior in particular, can be transferred beyond family and near kin in order to build a
quasi-family based on distant kinship and ethnic ties. In this respect, there are clear
parallels with Peredo’s (2003, p. 398) concept of spiritual kin-based business—“relations
marked by social, cultural and religious rituals of incorporation . . . [through which] the
concept of family expands beyond the biological family.” Unlike Peredo, however, who
suggests that spiritual kin-based business comprises a distinct category of relations that
operate separately from the biological family, we conceptualize the quasi-family as a set
of relations that overlap and are intertwined with the biological family. Thus, we observed
a family business in which the owner-manger exhibited a similar set of altruistic behaviors
toward blood and nonblood relations, and was “rewarded” with a reciprocal set of
altruistic behaviors in return. This further reduced problems of agency, and was crucial to
Neroli’s successful attempts to expand into new markets.
Our third contribution is to show that there are limits to altruism as family businesses
become larger and more mature. Specifically, and broadly consistent with Gomez-Mejia
et al. (2001) and Schulze et al. (2003), we observed that altruism became unbalanced and
that agency costs increased. Interestingly, the agency problems we observed were differ-
ent with respect to family members and near kin on the one hand, and quasi-family
members and distant kin on the other. Family members were observed to engage in moral
hazard, and in particular to shirk, free ride, and consume perks. While Karov was very
concerned by this behavior, he did not seek to sanction family and near kin, nor did he
offer financial incentives to alter their behavior, which has been shown to reduce moral
hazard in other family firms (Schulze et al., 2003). The dominant agency cost with respect
to quasi-family members was adverse selection. Specifically, the firm struggled to find
suitably qualified professionals. Neroli also had problems finding effective distribution
partners outside of Eastern Europe where it was more difficult to find partners linked
through ethnic ties. This was a significant factor behind Neroli’s failed attempts to expand
into Western Europe and North America.
Caveats and Limitations
Taken together, we believe that our findings represent an important step forward in
developing a more complete theory of the family firm and in augmenting existing insights
about the effects of altruism on agency costs in family business. However, given that our
findings are based on a single case study and that the geographical and sociopolitical
context of the case is quite unique, we must be cautious about the generalizations that we
make from our research.
It is our view that the findings about altruism and agency costs have the potential to
be generalized to family businesses in other contexts, including Western Europe and North
America; family-based altruism is a universal concept, and we believe that it is likely to
manifest itself in similar ways in family businesses across cultures. However, our findings
about the role of the quasi-family in family business might be less generalizable. Although
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owner-managers of family firms are likely to exhibit altruistic behavior toward nonfamily
members in different settings, the ways that different ethnic groups relate to one another
and respond to altruistic behavior are likely to differ.
Directions for Future Research
Our study suggests a number of directions for future research. Most obviously, given
that we rely upon a single case study, further research involving large samples of family
firms in different settings is needed in order to test the robustness of our findings. Of
particular interest is the extent to which the changing pattern of agency costs that we
identified holds across family businesses in different jurisdictions. Do agency costs tend
to be correlated to firm size and age, and what other factors are likely to influence the
evolution of the principal–agent relationship in family firms?
A second direction for future research concerns the role of the quasi-family in
different settings. We have conceptualized ethnicity as being socially constructed. In our
case study, it was based around a shared experience of living under communism. An
interesting question, we suggest, is the extent to which the nature of the bond that binds
particular ethnic groups effects the formation of the quasi-family. If ethnicity was based
around, e.g., university ties or a religious affiliation, would the dynamics of the quasi-
family differ?
Finally, our study raises important questions about the propensity of family firms to
engage in an international business. There are relatively few studies that examine this
issue, and even less that consider new ventures that internationalize from inception.
Of particular interest are the effects of family influence on the propensity and capacity of
family firms to internationalize. Given our findings, it seems possible that the family and
quasi-family provide an effective route to internationalization. Clearly, however, further
research is required in order to more fully understand the role of family influence in the
internationalization process of family firms.
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